ABSTRACT: To most philosophers, unmet claims based on distributive justice imply a political injustice -some have a complaint of justice against their political system. This article explores a variety of views about how this connection may be grounded or qualified: political institutions may be one tool among others to realize an independent good, distributive principles might regulate the distribution activities of political institutions, or distributive principles might apply in light of a special relation of a political institution and its members. We also consider a view prevalent in the social contract tradition that, in light of reasonable disagreement, one cannot demand that shared political institutions conform to one's own contentious distributive theory; members must seek terms with which all can live even though such term may not be anyone's most preferred possibility.
are not. Many possible things will never happen. The imagined theory simply constructs a vision of how things should and could be, even while acknowledging that they won't be…. So far, there is no discernable defect in the theory, I believe. For all we have said, the standards to which it holds people and institutions may be sound and true. The fact that people will not live up to them even though they could is a defect of people, not of the theory. For lack of a better term, let us call this kind of theory a version of hopeless realism.
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In a similar vein, Cohen (2008: 20) insists that the infeasibility of a vision of justice does not "defeat the claim of a principle." 6 Such theories might be described as conceptions of "cosmic justice." Charles Larmore (2013: 292n) contrasts views of cosmic justice with his own concern for "justice insofar as it has some import for social life." 7 Aaron James (2013: 104) similarly contrasts such cosmic justice with a political philosophy that we expect to be "normative for us." Elizabeth Anderson (2012: sect. 1) also criticizes such views, insisting that justice is fundamentally relational and tied to interpersonal accountability. We might also understand justice as having functions, such adjudication of competing claims and facilitation of cooperation among people pursuing diverse, often conflicting, ends. 8 Accounts of Distributive Justice as Pure State Judgments are unsuited for fulfilling that function, given their conceptual independence from our actual moral and physical circumstances. All these complaints pick up on the gulf between judgments of distributive justice and judgments about what a just state must do, require, or prohibit.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS WEAKLY ENDOGENOUS TO THE POLITICAL: AN ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTALIST VIEW

An Endogenous Instrumentalist View
Recall that we commenced with an apparently attractive view of the relation between the political and distributive justice: a critical aim of the political was to pursue distributive justice.
The problem with the exogenous account we have explored is that, seeing distributive justice as a good entirely external to the political that describes states of affairs rather than actions or policies, it becomes possible that distributive justice might be a hopeless aspiration, which is beyond the ken of the political. There is, however, an alternative conceptualization of the instrumentalist idea that assures an instrumental link between the political and distributive justice. Arash Abizadeh (2007: 324) 
identifies a view along the lines of:
The Political as a Condition for Distributive Justice: A requirement (DJ) of distributive justice is justified only when (a) there is a current political institution that can secure DJ or (b) it is feasible to create an institution that can secure DJ.
The Political as a Condition for Distributive Justice takes seriously Michael Blake's point that "states of affairs that are open to human control are, morally speaking, distinct from those that are not " (2001: 273) . The general upshot is that a principle of distributive justice can only condemn a state of affairs that is "in some sense amenable to control by human agency " (2001: 273) . Though being subject to human control seems a weak condition, it is an important qualification imposed by the Political as a Condition for Distributive Justice on any proposed principles of distributive justice. Let us consider two ways in the literature that the common sort of proposals for distributive justice seem to instrumentally require institutions and may be shown inapplicable when the necessary institutions cannot legitimately be established.
Institutions to Coordinate Distribution Efforts
Supposing a minimally-complex principle of distributive justice and a large-scale society, it is implausible that a just distribution can be secured by the decentralized efforts of uncoordinated individuals. "Given the scale of a modern economy, " Samuel Scheffler (2010: 115) writes, "the establishment and preservation of background justice requires far too much information and is far too complex a task to be accomplished by any set of rules that might plausibly guide individual conduct." Even if there was a shared substantive understanding of what distributive justice required, the uncoordinated efforts of individuals are unlikely to achieve it. Any proposed distributive standard will be informationally demanding if it involves relative shares, more so if those are shares across time (e.g., requiring equal lifetime income, as opposed to such equality at each moment), and further demanding yet if what the principle demands is at all choice sensitive.
These informational demands prevent individuals from reliably even knowing what changes would be moves toward or away from distributive justice. The lack of coordination in action amplifies the problem, for the actions of diverse people changing the distribution may cancel each other out or even create a less just distribution.
Considering the need to gather information and coordinate activity, it seems that most distributive principles will require institutions, and most likely political institutions empowered to command the relevant actions. We note that clause ( We should also note that many proposed principles of distributive justice must be rejected because some information gathering and coordination is infeasible even with political institutions. Rawls (1999: 81) , for instance, argues that the "currency" of justice cannot be utility because interpersonal utility comparisons are infeasible. He proposes instead the metric of "social primary goods" such as income, in part because these resources are measurable in a way likely to produce inter-subjective agreement. We can effectively rule out any principles that use criteria we cannot reliably assess.
If no institutions for coordinating distributions are relevantly feasible, then no principles 9 Many anarchists argue that the threat of despotism applies also to all states. For instance, Mikhail Bakunin ([1873] 1972: 328) writes: "Every state power, every government, by its very nature places itself outside and over the people and inevitably subordinates them to an organization and to aims which are foreign to and opposed to the real needs and aspirations of the people." We can thus see the outlines of an anarchistic case against distributive justice.
Political and Distributive Justice/11
of distributive justice at all may be justified. For instance, Hayek (1945: 528-9 ) argues that we rely on decentralized decision-making within a market order not only for economic growth, but simply to maintain our economic position through changing conditions (cf. Mises [1920] 2009: 105-6). Drawing on decentralized decisions, he argues, results in distributions that fail to match any substantive distributive principles, and attempts to make the distribution satisfy those principles are destructive of the market order. We can thus see Hayek as arguing that we have sufficient reason to reject institutions that would attempt to coordinate the realization of almost any distributive principles. Such principles, having no acceptable means for their realization, would all be invalidated. Distributive justice is shown to be, as Hayek put it, a mirage.
Assurance
Among the conditions most difficult to satisfy is that a proposed principle of justice must be such that, should we seek to realize it, we can solve the assurance problem. fundamental pillar of Hayek's (1976: 117) argument is that the specific distribution emerging from a market order has "not been brought about deliberately." As he argues, the distribution that emerges is unplanned and not the result of anyone's intentional choice. The closest we can get to questions of distributive justice for the unplanned market order is to ask whether the system of rules in which individuals make their choices is a good system in that it provides each with good ex ante prospects, though these is no guarantee of how they will eventually do.
Distributive Justice as Norms for Political Distributors
The classical liberal critique of distributive justice leaves open the possibility that distributive requirements do indeed apply when there is a distributor of resources, such as a state. Hayek The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests: "To justify discrimination in the attention accorded to the interests of different persons, one must be able to point to a difference between them relevant to the discrimination being made. This might be formulated negatively as the principle that there cannot be first-class and second-class persons... " (1988: 117) .
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This principle regulates decisions and actions, and is not in the first instance a criterion for evaluating states of affairs in terms of the degree to which the interests of different persons are satisfied. (Thus it is very nearly the opposite of Distributive Justice as Pure State Judgments, §1.1.2) According to Benn (1988: 118) , the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests does not apply to every decision, but only when "the decision maker had an obligation in this case to deal fairly -to set aside his preferences for the sake of universally acceptable reasons." So, for example, he tells us that Caroline need not justify the "discrimination" she expresses in choosing to marry one person rather than another on the basis of personal preference. The fact that the interests of other potential spouses are affected is not sufficient to generate claims against Caroline. For Benn liberty is the default and the demands of impartial treatment are a special case.
On Benn's analysis, far-reaching requirements of distributive fairness arise for modern states only because discharging the tasks they have undertaken, as a matter of history, brings into play the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. "Where everyone now, as a moral person, had a right to vote, and economic management and income distribution became a regular and recognized feature of State policy, everyone's need became a subject of claims on State consideration, and this as a matter of just distribution... " (1988: 250) . Instead of seeing just distributions as an independent good that the state can or should promote, Benn argues that these matters of justice only arise for political institutions that have taken up the tasks of managing and allocating resources. If a state is to take up such tasks, extending beyond the "night-watchman state," it must do so in a way that gives equal consideration to the interests of each citizen. 14 14 According to Benn, "Human welfare rights arise, not directly from a right that one's needs, even one's basic needs, be satisfied, but rather from a right to fair treatment, to the equal consideration of one's interests along with
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Benn's equal consideration principle creates only a limited scope for principles of distributive justice. Mere distributions in the world are of no special concern. As Hayek and Nozick stressed, the distributions that emerge unintentionally from the decentralized decisions of individuals exercising their rights, including the right to show partiality, are not appropriate objects for judgments of distributive justice. Distributive justice in the guise of the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests applies only to those distributive activities for which impartiality is required. Indeed, Benn's principle is a norm governing organizational actions, including those of the state, and only indirectly about securing distributions. Distributive justice thus arises as a problem within politics, not as an external problem for politics to solve.
The Existence of Political Institutions and the Value of Distributive Justice
A special claim of distributive justice arising from the activity of states can be grounded in other The answer seems easy: the correct one. Let us grant that. Yet this is of no help at all, for our disagreement is about whose judgment is the correct one, so our problem remains. But perhaps this is too quick. To many philosophers, this really is no problem at all for Alf. Having reasonable confidence that he is correct, he must insist that the just state conform to his judgment, for he has identified the correct policy α. So, he asks, "what's the problem?" And since Betty, Zedra and all the rest will reason in precisely the same way, they won't see any problem either. And so no one will see any problem, so we might be tempted to conclude that there is no problem.
Hobbes provided perhaps the earliest and most incisive analysis as to why there truly is a problem. In this dispute Alf (and the same holds for each of the others) thinks himself "wiser than all others," and clamours and demands "right reason for judge, yet seek no more but that things should be determined by no other men's reason" but his own. But this, says, Hobbes ([1668] 1994: ch. 5, ¶3) , is "intolerable in the society of men," for our collective problem is that we seek to live together under a common framework (e.g., the state), but our use of our For Hobbes, because any dispute arising from differences in private judgment can lead to conflict, we must always be prepared -on any issue -to take the judgment of the sovereign as the mark of right reason, and so the correct judgment. This requires that each be prepared to abandon acting on her personal judgment whenever the sovereign deems it necessary: "we are not every one," says Hobbes ([1668] 1994: ch. 37, ¶13), "to make our own private reason, or conscience, but the public reason, that is, the reason of God's supreme lieutenant, judge." This sort of radical abandonment of reliance on personal conscience in favor of the sovereign's is not quite so anachronistic as one might think. More radical theories of democracy, which are attracted to the maxim Vox populi, vox dei ("the voice of the people is the voice of god"), advocate a similar deference to public judgment, albeit of the majority. Not much is changed if we add that the democratic process has significant epistemic tendencies to be correct; as long as the epistemic properties of democracy are not so overwhelming that only a rationally flawed person would refuse to change her judgment in the face of its pronouncements, a person would still be committed to taking its output as, for public purposes, the correct judgment even though 18 Although the sovereign cannot directly command us to believe a proposition since belief is not under the control of the will, Hobbes appears to hold (i) the sovereign has authority to declare public truths from which we are obligated not to dissent; (ii) we can be obligated to publicly affirm these truths; and (iii) the sovereign has authority to shape the environment in which opinions are formed ([1668] 1994: ch. 32, ¶5, ch. 37, ¶13).
her best personal reflections lead her to disagree.
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Hobbes's view is so radical in the social contract tradition, not because he thinks that a just political life requires abandoning private judgment, but because he insists that one is committed to abandoning private judgment on any issue the sovereign decides public judgment is required. 20 It is almost always overlooked that Locke agrees with Hobbes that personal moral judgments about civil matters must be excluded in a just political order. He concurs that diversity of private judgment about not only religion, but the dictates on natural law, is a fundamental social fact that must be reconciled with the demands of social order. Peace and justice, Locke Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties" (emphasis added). It is the task of government to serve as Umpire -the voice of public reason; it yields a common judgment that provides a definitive, public, understanding of the demands of morality.
It should be stressed that a political justice that requires abandoning private judgment about public morality in no way precludes distributive justice from being part of political justice.
If that is what the "umpire" (the sovereign, the majority) decides, then that is what public morality requires. If the political process determines that principle DJ is part of political justice, then so be it. This view does, however, reject at its very root the Political Authority of Moral Conviction: no private citizen can claim that political justice requires DJ because according to her own moral conscience DJ is correct. That is precisely the claim that the social contract is intended to eliminate. More than that, though, on Hobbes's view, should one's private conscience determine that DJ is correct and DJ deems distribution x to be unjust, while political justice based on public reason declares x just, as a citizen seeking to be politically just one must uphold the public justice of x. Thus we are led to:
The Normative Autonomy of Political Justice: Alf, who believes that on the best view of morality, some distribution x is unjust, can reasonably endorse x as politically just, or just from the political point of view.
Unless the Normative Autonomy of Political Justice obtains, political justice cannot be decoupled from personal judgments of justice. The social contract/public reason solution to the problem of disagreement requires that a reasonable person must be able to admit the normativity of the requirements of public justice, while holding contrary views based on her personal deliberations and her preferred "theory of distributive justice." Yet many will ask: how can anyone coherently conform to such a principle?
2.3 THREE ROUTES TO THE NORMATIVE AUTONOMY OF POLITICAL JUSTICE
Hobbesian Self-Effacing Authorization
As has already been mentioned ( §2.2), at the center of Hobbes's account was a contract in which one authorizes another's judgment as if it were one's own. This authorization is self-effacing in the sense that one's own personal judgment about morality becomes irrelevant to political justice. It is important that Hobbes insisted that the sovereign could violate the laws of nature, and a citizen could be correct in her judgment that the sovereign did so ([1668] 1994: ch. 31, ¶7, ch., 26, ¶24, ch. 28, ¶ ¶22-23, ch. 30, ¶15) . But because of the social contract the judgment of the subject has no public standing, and so is no complaint against the sovereign; more than that, the
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subject has authorized the judgment of the sovereign on this matter, and so (political) justice demands conformity to (indeed public endorsement of) his decision.
Reasonable people could only be driven into such a thoroughly self-effacing authorization if, as Hobbes appears to insist, it is absolutely necessary for any stable social existence. In the face of the eruption of diverse moral and political judgments and political conflict in the seventeenth century, the only solution Hobbes saw as viable was for each to renounce all implications for political, public, justice of one's personal moral and religious judgments. Pace Hobbes, early modern citizens were not prepared to purchase social stability at this price, and, most emphatically, neither are twenty-first century liberals.
Rawlsian Political Constructivism
The power and originality of Rawls's (2005: xlii, 12 ) political constructivism in his political liberalism project was to seek a distinctively public, political, understanding of justice that was free-standing in relation to the diverse moral views and comprehensive theories of justice. 21 As Rawls said in his first version of his Dewey Lectures 22 ([1980] 1999: 306-7) , the aim is to:
search for reasonable grounds for reaching agreement rooted in our conception of ourselves and in our relation to society…. The task is to articulate a public conception of justice that all can live with…. What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an antecedent order to and given to us, but its congruence with our deepest
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understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us.
We can find no better basic charter for our social world [emphasis added].
The aim is to construct a public conception of justice out of the common elements of the public culture. Unlike Hobbesian public reason, this political conception would be one that we all (or at least the overwhelming majority) could endorse, as it is the view that can be derived from what we share. Thus Rawls does not require us to be nearly so self-effacing as does Hobbes; the public conception is one that, from the public point of view, we all share.
Rawls originally thought that from these distinctively public, shared, materials a public conception of distributive justice could be constructed. Such a political conception has precious little in common with a view such a Cohen's ( §1.1.1): it is not seeking to develop the morally correct theory of distributive justice, but one that can serve as the basis of public life and normative order in a diverse society. As is well-known, as Rawls's thinking about this distinctively public, political, conception developed, he became increasing skeptical that there was a uniquely justifiable public criterion of distributive justice. Given the deep disagreements about distributive justice, his original aim could only be seen as extraordinarily optimistic.
Instead of establishing the unique reasonability of his two principles of justice as the criterion of public justice, Rawls ultimately concluded that the public construction identified a family of "liberal conceptions of justice." Although he believed all members of the family issued requirements concerning the provision of resources, the family as such was not committed to any criterion of distribution, though he still believed that his "difference principle" was part of one such reasonable public construction (Rawls, 2005: xlvi-xlviii, 5ff.) . It is, though, hard not to be skeptical that in our highly diverse societies the nearly-universally shared elements are thick
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enough to build the rather robust political constructions (fair equality of opportunity, the difference principle, and restrictions on advertising!) that Rawls (2005: 365) envisaged.
It is important to stress that not only did the free-standing argument seek to show that endorsement of political justice did not require citizens to be self-effacing, since they concur on the elements of the construction, but, crucially, once they considered their entire set of moral and religious commitments, they would continue to endorse the conception of political justice. At least, he hoped that such an "overlapping consensus," providing further support for the free- political justice really needs to be endorsed by the full moral and religious commitments of citizens, the prospects of a robust egalitarian distributive liberalism being justified as part of political justice look pretty slim. In the eyes of Jonathan Quong (2011: 167-9), Rawls's claim that overlapping consensus is required for full justification holds political justice "captive" to those with inegalitarian moral commitments. 23 Quong thus eliminates overlapping consensus as a test for the acceptability of the outcome of Rawls's free-standing argument from the original position. Quong, then, seems to acknowledge that a liberal political justice with commitment to a robust criterion of distributive justice requires many citizens to be significantly morally selfeffacing; classical liberal citizens, for example, must set aside their wider moral and philosophical commitments to endorse public justice (cf. Gaus 2012: 7-15).
Convergent Normativity
Quong seems to present Rawlsian liberals, upholding the Normative Autonomy of Political Justice ( §2.2), with something of a dilemma. On the one hand, the Rawlsian can stay true to her robust egalitarian theory of political justice (including, say, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle), but only at the cost of eliminating the idea that political justice must be supported by an overlapping consensus. Thus citizens are required to be significantly selfeffacing with respect to their wider moral views: they must set aside their personal moral convictions (including their preferred theories of distributive justice) in order to endorse the normativity of political justice. Quong, as we have seen, takes this more Hobbesian-inclined path. The alternative is to accept Quong's conclusion that the Rawlsian cannot have her robust egalitarianism and overlapping consensus too, but to pursue overlapping consensus. On this view, the aim is to try to minimize the extent to which a political conception of justice requires citizens to set aside their moral and religious convictions when they participate in a common, moral, political life.
The aim of what we might call "convergent normativity theorists" (Gaus 2011; Vallier, 2014) is to show that a very wide range of moral and religious perspectives can converge on endorsing a set of political institutions and basic rules as normatively acceptable ways to live together. Given our moral disagreements, we will not agree on what rules and institutions are best. When one is building a house alone, one can follow only one's judgment about the optimal
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house (consistent with feasibility qua budget constraints); but when building a common dwelling, each cannot go about building her optimal house, nor insist that all work together to build her optimal house. What we seek is a common structure -there are perhaps many that, as Rawls said, "all can live with" -that all can see as sufficiently answering to their important moral concerns, and which does not violate their moral integrity by insisting that they be selfeffacing when deciding on what they can live with. That was always the aim of the social contract tradition: to devise rules and institutions that all could agree sufficiently promote their concerns to make the institution worth the willing endorsement of each. The institution, while not best in the eyes of all, is something each could live with.
This means, though, that an adequate theory of political justice will not present inspiring ideals. It will not be aspirational, or paint pictures of a society with perfect distributive justiceperfect, that is, on one vision. Rather, it will seek to investigate the types of arrangements and structures that allow those in a diverse society to live together in ways that all (or, at least, as many as is compatible with a moral order) endorse as normatively acceptable, a normative structure that allows each to seek to flourish as she understands that protean ideal. We all are free to think through the moral world for ourselves, and our collective political justice should not require ignoring these reflections. But neither can an ordered and cooperative social life exist when each elevates her own "theory of justice" into the authoritative blueprint for all.
Conclusion
More than half a century ago Bertrand de Jouvenel (1956: 139) described "social" or "distributive" justice as the "obsession of our time." It has certainly been the obsession of political philosophy. For the most part this obsession has manifested itself in rather intricate and
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controversial "moral theories of distributive justice" that seek to shape political justice. We have analyzed the many different ways these theories have been coupled with the political, but in our view they all fail to appreciate the fundamental requirement of a moralized political life in a diverse society -that political justice must be significantly autonomous of controversial moral "theories" as well as religious convictions. The moral theorist of distributive justice has far too often taken on the role of the high priest, sending down from her ivory tower instructions for political authority.
Although it is too often -we fear, usually -overlooked, the genius of Rawls was his realization that such moralized political theory is inappropriate as a basis of political justice in our diverse society. His proposal was striking: we must follow the social contract tradition in recognizing the relative normative autonomy of the political, yet we can construct a distinctively political standard of distributive justice that all can endorse. As we have argued, we believe this project failed, and those who appreciate his genius must now choose what to pursue: their devotion to a theory of distributive justice, or the ideal of a conception of political justice that all good-willed, free and equal, citizens can endorse without self-effacement.
